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I

ON THE FUTURE OF TOTAL THEORY
SCIENCE, ANTISCIENCE, AND HUMAN CANDOR

ince we will be talking about science and
antiscience, let me begin by recalling the work of
Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles Darwin.
Erasmus was a naturalist like his grandson. He
was distinguished in his time and is well known still in his
own right. But he wrote scientific works in verse, even what
might be called poems. One of them was The Botanic
Garden, and the best known and most effective part of it
was entitled The Loves ofthe Plants. 1 It was full of imagery
from the classics and from biology, full of metaphor and
play. Our noticing this blending of science and poetry and
the absence of any sense of alienness one from the other,
under the name Erasmus, may be the best way to start our
inquiry here.
I want to ask this afternoon, with you, three questions
about the grand visions of our time.
Is the truth of science that science itself, viewed
scientifically, is but a passing creature of history? We have
all heard perhaps of the contemporary "science wars," popularized recently by the Sokal hoax, the "wars" being the
challenge by sociologists and historians of science to the
cumulative and definitive quality of scientific insight, sometimes called its "objectivity." These wars began in a serious
way with that most-cited of modern books, Thomas Kuhn's
The Structure ofScientific Revolutions. 2 But the challenge
goes back, I should think, to the ancient Greek Heraclitus,
teaching that all is process and flux.
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This is the first question I want to raise - at least raise
- whether it must be true that science is a passing product
of cultural process as the mayfly is the passing product of
processes, and is no more the truth about the world than the
mayfly is the truth.
The second question is this: Must belief in science lead
eventually to atrocity? This is a shocking question to scientists, more troubling that it should even be asked than the
so-called postmodernist challenge to objective truth. It is
not part of the "science wars" of today. It proceeds rather
from the 19th-century rise of positivism and logical positivism and the denial of the existence of value as such. But it is
very much connected to the claims for and against the reach
and objectivity of the scientific vision of the world.
This second question is also connected, through the
special experience of our century, to the third question that
has been pressing itself on me. That question is equally
shocking, indeed might be treated as insulting to good
scientists, and it is whether there is a connection at the root
between total theories of the nature of the world currently
being sought and taught, "final" theories they are sometimes
called, "unified" theories, and the total in totalitarian social
and political theories which are distinctive to this century.
This third question is in a way heuristic, for it combines
the first two in the particular context of our own history.
These three questions comprise the general question of
the future of all-embracing theory, truly cosmological theory,
in academic and popular thought and discussion: whether
science dissolves into history or, as it were, swallows itself
when viewed scientifically; whether allegiance to or belief in
science must lead eventually to atrocity; and whether there
is a connection between totalitarian social and political
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thought and total theory of a mathematical, physical, or
biological kind.
otal theories are not peculiar to this century
or the last, but fascination with them is
something of a mark of our time. They have
acquired for many the quality of an ideal,
an engine of work and thought and argument, striving and
fight. Think of Stephen Hawking at the end of A Brief
History ofTime, 3 anticipating choosing a "complete theory''
from "a small number of complete unified theories ... that
are self-consistent and allow the existence of structures as
complicated as human beings." And total theories are fascinating. An all-embracing theory, total in its reach, circles
back and explains the theorist proposing the theory as well
as those to whom the theory is proposed. A total theory
reaches out to explain challenges to the theory, to explain
even the very language in which the theory is expressed and
urged, and, as may appear, believed. With nothing outside
it, nothing partial about it, with those who think, talk, and
argue about it included within its terms, it is ultimate, final,
closed.
I say total rather than comprehensive - thought or
vision that seeks to be as consistent as it can and keeps to
the hope of coherence is another matter. "Totalizing" might
serve as well because of the active quality of a total theory,
stealing like Newton's sleep over the theorist. And total
theory need not be what is called "materialist reductionism,"
declaring the reality and sole reality of what working scientists assume for purposes of their investigations. "Historicists" who challenge the objectivity of science may be total
theorists, as may social scientists who draw science into the
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subject matter of their analysis and students of culture who
make science a subject of cultural studies. They may be
ambivalent about whether belief and idea are natural objects.
But whatever their ambivalence on this, they move, as theorists, to depersonalize, define, and objectify belief and idea
and work with them as the product of processes and "no
more than" the product of processes.
Academic or nonacademic, I think all know when they
are personally or vicariously in the vicinity of a theory that
is a "theory of everything," or total. It will be remembered
how objections to Freudian explanation became the
clinical condition of "resistance" to Freudian explanation.
Challenge to the conspiracy theories of 19th-century
antisemitism only showed that the challenger was part of the
conspiracy. Opposition to Maoist theory was evidence of
the truth of Maoism and provided grounds for the elimination of the objector. These and the like are part of common
lore, sources of dark jokes easily caught; and caught in them
is the flavor if not the essence of total theory. Whether
benign or not benign - and the Freudian was meant to be
liberating, as indeed is Maoism meant to be - total theory
absorbs the listener to whom it is propounded.
But equally essential, and especially for what I want to
suggest here, it applies to the theorist propounding it. "I am
this," he cries, and dives in; and if he believes it, he becomes
it and is not seen again. At that point he cannot judge it
and cannot escape it by judging it, because he is it. If he
were even open to argument about it, it would not be total
for him.
What is also common, what signals the presence of a
total theory today, is absence of value, significance, meaning,
purpose large and small. Common is the absence of
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substance, when our word "substance" takes meaning by
contrast with "process." Common is the absence of the
person, and of the individual which is not quite the same, of
the sacred, of course, and mystery, of course, and doubt, of
course - and with the absence of the person, what strikes at
the very possibility of human law: absence of transcending
the here in space and the now in time, absence of faith and
good faith, and, ultimately, of authority and mutual deference, for totalizing is a flight from an open-ended responsibility toward a closed and final certainty. The sense of system
and the sense of coldness together convey these absences, in
both "materialist reductionism" that universalizes the working language of modern science, and in the social science,
the philosophy, and the history that do not now use that
working language but still proceed with their own units
of reference on the axiom that human experience can be
captured.
I myself am brought to the general question of the
future of final theories, unified theories, theories of everything, cosmologies modern and postmodern, for two reasons. One is that, as I have indicated, I do not believe legal
authority, or human law, can live if any total theory is true
or believed to be true. And second, the legal mind and ear
- not just mine - are especially and immediately intrigued
with the statements of total theory made by those who make
them, because of the working premise in law, which is not
necessarily a working premise in propositionally based disciplines, that thought and action are connected. This working
premise points the lawyer (and I think there is a lawyer in
us all) to the humanity and the behavior of the scientist as
a person, though this person is speaking in the grandest or
most cosmological way.
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And aside from the reading of action - what the cosmologist does and refrains from doing - and with regard
just to what is said in script and sound about the nature of
the world, the legal instinct or working method is similarly
to listen to a person's testimony as a whole, all that is being
said, in and around the cosmological, before concluding
what any part of it including the cosmological might mean.
The legal instinct is to listen to the whole evidence presented
before concluding what, indeed, any of the words might
mean in which theoretical propositions are couched.
I am drawn to total theory and its future for these reasons. And drawn to the questions it poses, I may say that I
myself, now, do not believe that anyone need be pushed to
deny truth to science, to see it as a passing phenomenon, a
natural object like the mayfly. Nor do I think that scientific
method and the embracing of science, demanding as it does
such trust and devotion transcending generations and time,
must lead to dehumanization and atrocity - I think that
there is the scientist in each of us just as there is the lawyer
in each of us (though some of you may regret the latter).
But, for this to be so, I think that total theory must be
given up, the dream of it, the very possibility that it might
be true. One of the reasons that encourages me to think this
(if "encourage" is not too nice a word in this context) is that
I do suspect there is a deep connection between totalitarian
social and political thought with its consequences that we
now know so well, or in the view of some we are only just
beginning to face, and total theories of the nature of the
world that so many feel pushed now to espouse in school,
polemic, book, article, review, or provocative conversation.
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ome examples of the total or totalizing: The first,
from a legal context, points also to that connection, echo, similarity, between the totalizing in
cosmological thought and in social thought that
I suspect and fear and at the same time would draw out
to question whether those who espouse total theory mean
what they seem to say.
The American Bar Association Journal recently highlighted a symposium of experts brought together to
discuss "a pair of questions: Is human behavior and, more
specifically, criminal behavior, the result of social factors,
biological factors, or a combination of the two? And if it's
the latter, what combination of factors makes up the mix,
and in what proportion?" The answer, the Bar journal reported, was that "What we do know is that human behavior
appears to be governed by a complicated and ever-changing
mix of biological and environmental factors." 4 The formulation is a common one. You will note the word "govern" in
this answer stating "what we do know," and you will note
that there is no third participant in this government. The
person is missing from this analysis. The person may be
assumed or implied - there are references to "we" elsewhere
in the Bar journal report. But, in what is said, urged, and
taught that is in the background of the analysis, this absence
is made explicit - there is nothing outside or beyond the
analysis of biological and environmental factors. It is allembracing and it is exclusive. And when the absence of the
person is thus made explicit in analysis that is meant to be
all-embracing, there is proffered a world view.
Lawyers struggle daily with such a world view in administering the insanity defense and in making use of expert
testimony to determine criminal responsibility. In that
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world view including all, there is always an invitation to see
law as system and those in law as systems rather in the way
administrators working in harsh conditions see offenders
whom they deem sociopathic, which is the way sociopaths
are seen to view their victims, all as subjects for manipulation and intervention, systems all, which manipulation and
intervention are themselves part of the workings of a system.
There is no place for cruelty in it, just as there is no place
for authority. The question of cruelty, like the question of
respect, does not arise, cannot enter the mind, when what is
seen is ultimately only a system, nothing but and nothing
more than a system. There is no one speaking and no one
listening, only "governance" by forces operating.
If we move to a more general level, a representative
example of theorizing of a total kind - one of many that
could be chosen from many disciplines - is the contemporary work of the well-known and distinguished American
philosopher John Searle. In The Rediscovery ofthe Mind
(I 992) and The Construction ofSocial Reality (1995) 5 Searle
speaks of "what sort of place the universe is and how it
works" and a world view that is "so well established as to be
no longer optional for reasonably well-educated citizens of
the present era." "Basic to our world view is the idea that
human beings and other higher animals are part of the biological order like any other organisms .... [T] he biologically
specific characteristics of these animals - ... their capacity
for language ... their capacity for rational thought, etc. are biological phenomena like any other biological phenomena.... [L]ike it or not, it is the world view we have. Given
what we know about the details of the world ... this world
view is not an option. It is not simply up for grabs along
with a lot of competing world views."
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He observes, "It would be tricky to try to define the
notion of a system, but the simple intuitive idea is that
systems are collections of particles where the spatio-temporal
boundaries of the system are set by causal relations ....
Babies, elephants, and mountain ranges ... are examples of
systems." And he goes on, "We live in exactly one world,
not two or three or seventeen ... a world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, and in which
some of these particles are organized into systems that are
conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves." Then in an
aside that attracts the lawyer's attention, Searle adds, "The
world of Supreme Court decisions ... is the same world as
the world of the formation of planets and of the collapse of
the wave function in quantum mechanics."
It is the oneness of that one world, that world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force - it is its
exclusiveness and its totality, that exhausts reality and leaves
no place for any other thing in human experience.
I think the passage I have read from Searle is representative. Others, including practicing scientists doing wonderful
things with the methods and presuppositions of science, may
think it extreme. Much of the evidence for any impression
about the atmosphere of our own time is in what the
proposer of it has been led to read by chance and instinct.
One can only ask whether one's impression is similar to
others' impressions that are similarly based on what they
have heard and been led to read by chance and instinct.
Each of us could come in with our bags of clippings, quoted
remarks, highlighted paragraphs from textbooks. But there
could be no statistical resolution, no poll, when the question
is who are to be taken seriously and, of course, how they
are to be interpreted. One more example then that I find

9

JOSEPH

VINING

resonant, this not from a bar journal report or from a philosopher who is necessarily once removed from the working
scientist, but from the physiologist and Nobel Prize winner
Fran<;:ois Jacob, whose Logic ofLife: A History ofHeredity
(1973) and The Possible and the Actual (1982) are classic
texts in modern biological theory and teaching.
As biological thought developed, Jacob says, "What
could impose a limit on understanding the living world was
... no longer a difference in nature between the living and
the inanimate worlds. It was the inadequacy of our means
and even of our possibility of analysis." ''An organism is
merely a transition," he says - and there is that word
"merely" again - "a stage between what was and what will
be. Reproduction represents both the beginning and the
end, the cause and the aim .... Every object that biology
studies is a system of systems .... [T]he operational value
of the concept oflife has continually dwindled and its power
of abstraction declined. Biologists no longer study life
today. They no longer attempt to define it. Instead they
investigate the structure of living systems, their functions,
their history.... [B]iology has demonstrated that there is no
metaphysical entity hidden behind the word 'life.' ... From
particles to man, there is a whole series of integration, of
levels, of discontinuities. But there is no breach either in the
composition of the objects or in the reactions that take place
in them, no change 'in essence.'"6

ith John Searle and Frarn;:ois Jacob,
both much listened to and admired, as
examples, let us come back to the three
questions I put at the beginning, about
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the ultimate vanishing of science itself, about atrocity, and
about totalitarianism.
I worded those questions without circumlocution, using
the uncomfortable words "atrocity" and "totalitarian," but
not too strongly, I think, in view of the hostile tone and
aggressive wording of assertions of total theory commonly
encountered today. Absolutely critical is the proposition
that, in Searle's or Jacob's words, life and the human be
"continuous" with the rest of nature as now conceived.
Discontinuities there may be between levels of explanation
- the physical, the chemical, the biological, the neurological, the social. Change in view with new evidence is to be
expected. But the essential does not change, new worlds are
not entered, the discontinuities are there to be filled; what
emerges is still a property and a property of a system which
is, as Jacob says, "part of a higher-order system itself." It is
hard to miss the real delight taken in demonstrations that
there is (here my example is Cambridge historian of science
Michael Redhead) "no special significance in the evolution
of human beings as compared, say; with galaxies or any other
example of a quasi-stable, physical system that sustains itself
far from thermal equilibrium with its environment." Redhead is approvingly reviewing a new cosmological proposal
attempting an evolutionary explanation of the constants of
physics so that there is at last nothing in physics that rests
on "something outside the universe. "7
The word "special" used as a pejorative, as in the
phrase frequently heard that Redhead uses, "no special
significance," is one of the signs of being in the vicinity of
a total theory - the other, of course, is that you, and the
theorist, are both included in the description. Like anything
one can be in the vicinity of, it can have effects in the world,
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on others, on oneself, on oneself through others. And it is
therefore not unfair to place beside these claims examples
from the experience of our century of our capacity to act as
if there were no lines we could not cross, nothing special,
really, no difference, really, between the inanimate and the
living, or between the living and the human.
Thus, for the absence of any special difference between
human beings and other living things: When one of the
doctors who experimented on children in German concentration camps was asked at his trial in 1966, "If you were
of the opinion that Jews were more disposed to TB than
Aryans, why then did you experiment with Jews at all? ...
Why didn't you use guinea pigs?" The doctor replied, "For
me there was no basic difference between human beings and
guinea pigs." Then he corrected himself, "Between Jews
and guinea pigs." 8 Or consider this grant application in
the 1940s to the German Research Foundation by Hans
Nachtsheim, who postwar continued work at one of the
academically distinguished Max Planck Institutes in West
Germany, the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Genetic
Biology and Genetic Pathology. Nachtsheim's application
and experiments were brought out recently at a retrospective
exhibition in Germany, tided The Value ofthe Human
Being. 9 I quote from it partly for its familiar grant-application language, its justifications directed to peer reviewers:
Since there was a marked difference in our
animal research on epilepsy between the behavior
of older and younger specimens, we tested epileptic
children under similar conditions in pressure chambers. Up until now only children between 11 and
13 were at our disposal. At a pressure corresponding
to IV to 6,000 meters no epileptic attacks occurred.
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In humans age 11 to 13 corresponds to 5 to 6
months of age in rabbits, an age at which the cramp
threshold, as is also the case with rabbits, is not so
low as to induce cramps with certain regularity .
under pressure chamber conditions. To have a
basis of comparison, we would need to test epileptic
children between 5 to 6 years of age.
With respect to the absence of any real difference between the inanimate and the living, the subjects of medical
experiments carried out in Manchuria during the Second
World War were called logs, "maruta. "10 When they were
delivered to the laboratories, they were trussed up like logs,
and in the account we have of what went on in Manchuria,
where we demonstrated the extent of what we as human
beings are at least capable of doing to one another, the
example is set out: "Laboratory technicians would then go
to either building 7 or 8, order guards to provide the number of 'logs' needed for the next experiment. .. . A special
pressure chamber ... was constructed to assist researchers in
determining how much pressure the human body could
absorb. Test subjects were locked into the chamber, their
bodies bearing a host of measuring devices. Pressure was
introduced, and increased gradually until the victims
collapsed in convulsions and died."
In the United States we have our own, perhaps somewhat less horrific examples, such as the Tuskegee experiment,
which involved active prevention of treatment for black men
with syphilis when penicillin became available. And lest
I leave any suggestion that law is without its own difficulties,
I should quote from one of our great figures, Justice Holmes,
who had at least said he believed that "the postulate upon
which we think about the universe is that there is a fixed
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quantitative relation between every phenomenon and its
antecedents and consequents," every phenomenon, including the phenomenon of human law and, of course, including his own mind.11 In his Supreme Court opinion strongly
approving Virginia's eugenics laws, Holmes's language was
this: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles
is enough." 12
said that one question pertinent to the future of
total theory is whether belief in science, science
unblinkingly faced, without evasion or prevarication,
leads to actions such as these. And I referred to the
pertinence of law's working premise, that thought and action
are connected.
That connection operates in both directions. There is
a prior question, what is the thought, what belief in science
is belief in, what "science" is, if you will, that must come
before seeing a connection between action and thought.
Lawyers read action as well as what is said, even as they are
reading the whole of what is said. A scientist or mathematician speaking cosmologically does not cease to be a human
person speaking and acting. Certainly what we actually
think affects what we do. But what we do reveals what
we think.
Thus every act of kindness, every staying of the hand
in general or in particular instances, is an indicator. The
well-known films from the University of Pennsylvania 13 of
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experiments on head trauma show investigators standing by
laughing while monkeys' heads are smashed again and again,
and the films produced revulsion. But the revulsion is to be
found within laboratories as well as outside, among teachers
and investigators when speaking and acting in their purely
professional roles as well as when speaking and acting among
friends and family at home. Not instinctive approval,
and saying "of course," but revulsion follows the medical
technician's explanation of his vivisection of a maruta or log
in Manchuria: "Vivisection should be done under normal
circumstances. If we'd used anesthesia, that might have
affected the body organs and blood vessels that we were
examining. So we couldn't have used anesthetic." 14
Revulsion is to be read, read as well as explained as itself
the operation of a system within an environment of systems,
which explanation by itself alone only reaches back to join
the fundamental basis of the technician's explanation of
vivisection without anesthetic.
What stands between us and experimentation or
"intervention" premised on the absence of anything sacred,
central, or special about the human, or life, is not simply a
system's calculation about its timing or about how far selfprotective, self-regulatory rules might be relaxed - the
system in question being the investigator. What protects us
is not a wholly manipulative response to external pressures,
a calculation whether it could presently be gotten away with
given the behavior and strength of prosecutors or the media.
What holds back scientists like nonscientists from doing
these things, what is pointed to by a thousand gestures large
and small, is something in actual belief and thought. How
can I or any of us say this? Any investigator may protest,
"No, there is nothing there in my belief and thought but
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what I say is there." But what is there would be for us to
decide, reading him as a whole. And once there is that
opening, that something more or that something beyond,
his vision is no longer completely closed. It has lost its
totality.
Belief in science need not lead to atrocity, because science, in fact, in its actuality, is not to be identified with total
theory and absorbed into it, any more than the scientist is to
be identified with some part of what he or she says. If the
teacher who says in the classroom that love is nothing more
than the operation of the limbic system is heard using the
word love at home at night, anyone listening, I should think,
would want to revisit what was said in the classroom. To the
same effect, read a history of science by a scientist who is not
an outsider to it, who has played a part in science, joining,
committing a life, sacrificing for the future, trusting, building, evaluating, deciding, teaching. Frarn;:ois Jacob's The
Logic ofLife: A History ofHeredity, which I quoted before,
is an example of a biologist writing a history of biology.
The history recounted moves forward toward truth through
error, including the error of "vitalism" or the specialness
and mystery of life ("life" being a word eventually put in
quotation marks, "spirit" or the animate and "mystery'' both
becoming pejoratives). The history of biology is a progressive evolution, its happenstances are serendipities, newness
in it is a better newness. Those who have participated in it,
like the author of the history, look forward vicariously to its
future, as a thing of value to be made possible by the active
devotion of a life.
How odd then the truth toward which this evolution
of truth has pointed, that all things studied including the
studier are systems of systems changing without direction
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and certainly without purpose, driven entirely by cause and
chance, "necessity" and chance, in which there is no progress
or even the conception of it, and no regression or even the
conception of it, and in which it may even be said that the
most basic rules of interaction are themselves a changing
product of process. How odd the contrast between this
all-encompassing account of the biological, and the vision
of the evolution of this all-encompassing account of the
biological, biology itself. Reading the history of biology by a
participant qualified to state for nonbiologists the insight of
biology, one can be forgiven for wondering about the generality of the statement of the insight, and for wanting to put
the two together, the biologist and biology, the history of
biology and the history of the world.
ndeed, total theory, were it true or believed to be
true, would challenge the doing of science. In the
introduction to his little book, The Tacit Dimension, 15
the chemist and philosopher of science Michael
Polanyi recounts the turning point in his thought and life,
his encounter with a truly total system, that was for the
moment being carried out in action, and in which, just as
in the representative visions of Searle and Jacob that I have
quoted, human beings were fungible and disposable systems
operating within a system. Polanyi met Bukharin in Moscow in 1935 when Bukharin was a leading theoretician of
the new social system. When Polanyi asked him about the
pursuit of pure science in Soviet Russia, Bukharin, in
Polanyi's words, said that "pure science was a morbid
symptom of a class society; under socialism the conception
of science pursued for its own sake would disappear, for the
interests of scientists would spontaneously turn" to fulfilling
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the state plan. Polanyi was "struck by the fact that this denial of the very existence of independent scientific thought
came from a socialist theory which derived its tremendous
persuasive power from its claim to scientific certainty. The
scientific outlook appeared to have produced a mechanical
conception of man and history in which there was no place
for science itself." This turned Polanyi from his work in
chemistry to the philosophy of science and to the question
of what science was that freedom of thought could be
claimed as necessary to pursue it.
Joseph Weizenbaum, the pioneer MIT computer programmer perhaps known to you as the author of the computer psychoanalyst ELIZA, had a similar encounter and
made a similar connection when he recently debated prominent cognitive scientists and faced the repeated statement
being made that the brain is merely a meat machine. In
English, he said, we have two words for what is being called
"meat." "Meat is dead, can be burned or eaten, can be
thrown away; whereas flesh is living flesh, and a certain sense
of dignity is associated with it. We don't talk about eating
flesh, and if we talk about burning flesh, it is a horror image.
Why... say 'meat machine' and not 'flesh machine'?" To say
the brain is merely a meat machine, he protested, "is a very
deliberate choice of words that clearly testifies to a kind of
disdain of the human being." The response made to him
was, "If we are to make further progress in Artificial Intelligence, we have to give up our awe ofliving things." 16
Weizenbaum went on to reflect that the political and cultural could not be separated from world view and a picture
of what it means to be a human being, with the consequences in totalitarian settings that all of us have seen.
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The encounter of science with the total in social and
political thought, the discovery that science itself is threatened, is akin to the challenge to science today in the socalled science wars. The two questions, on the one hand the
question whether science viewed scientifically must be seen
as a passing creature of history, if "scientifically" is actually
to mean viewing all from a stance that all without exception
is system and process, and on the other hand the question
whether belief in science, again if science is such a stance,
leads to dehumanization and atrocity, are connected through
the experience of our own century, certainly at the very least
as questions.
Weizenbaum felt the connection from one side; Polanyi
felt it from the other side. I have thought that the most
interesting warning note, which anticipated the recent historicist or constructivist challenge to science, was sounded
by Darwin - Charles, not his grandfather, Erasmus. Evolution is only part of what today is called a "final" theory that
is being sought, or a "TOE," a "theory of everything,"
though some as I have noted would push evolution back or
down to the constants of physics as they would push it up
to love. But what Darwin saw was that the grandest conclusions might be subject to his theory of evolution, that it
might move toward that absorption of the theorist, as well
as the theorized-about, which is the mark of total theory.
In his Autobiography, in a passage added when he was
revising his first draft, Darwin wrote "Then arises the doubt
- can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been
developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the
lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand
conclusions? May not these be the result of the connection
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between cause and effect which strikes us as a necessary one,
but probably depends merely on inherited experience?" He
went on in a letter, "[W]ith me the horrid doubt always
arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has
been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of
any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the
convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions
in such a mind?" 17
Now Darwin was not referring to his scientific work
in these passages, but Darwin was the most self-aware and
honest of investigators and would not have spared any part
of his thought. The particular reference of the first was his
personal conclusion of purpose alive in the universe and in
the operation of natural laws; the reference of the second
was his own position on the existence of God. Others of his
grand conclusions, including his insight into evolution and
its mechanisms, were no less candidates for this "horrid
doubt." If the theory itself were a natural phenomenon, it
would not be privileged among the phenomena of nature.
It was the product of a mind which was also a natural phenomenon, with nothing about it essentially different from
an appendix or a stag's antlers. Mind is simply a more
complicated system, with the "more" being without value,
merely a difference. The system speaks only of arrangements
that have led to its survival, given things as they are now.
Conclusions theoretical or otherwise are a product of mind;
mind is just something that happens. It is "what happens"
when things organize themselves into a certain state.
"With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the
convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from
the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all
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trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of
a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such
a mind?" We may have a rather higher opinion of the
monkey's mind, but Darwin was pointing to what the social
constructivists, the historicists, total theorists themselves, are
saying today about science and the truth of science. On its
own terms the theory of evolution is an emergent property
that will survive or not - in itself as something discrete,
and as part of a system of other emergent properties depending upon its relative advantage against competitors
in whatever environment faces them all in the future (an
environment that is, of course, a system, to which they
themselves contribute). Theory too, by definition, must
become a combination of units, a system, a system of
systems, a property of a system of systems. The theory of
evolution was, on its own terms, a chance variation, selected,
for this moment, to survive. It and a system of which it
becomes a part will, through a diversity generator (one such
is the behavior of material in DNA), produce further emergent properties, that will themselves form a system which
may or may not be selected further for survival. But it, the
theory, and the system of which it becomes a part, will produce further emergent properties that may be so selected,
only if it and its system happen to survive to do so, against
other systems producing properties in the same way.
There is not truth in what the system which is the
tongue, the hand, or the eye registers in sound or script from
the system which is the mind or brain. There is not truth in
the theory (as something discrete and definable as different
from something else), or in what came before it, or in what
it produces and what comes after it. There is only, in its
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own view of the world that includes itself, chance variation,
systemization, and selection, in competition with other
sequences of chance variation, systemization, and selection
going on all around "it." It, on its own terms, this very
vision of chance variation, systemization, and selection with
no assurance of survival, is as divorced from a true view of
the world as much as any other chance variation. It once
was not, is now, may not be for long - that is all that can
be said. That is all that can be said if the terms of the vision
extend to everything, if it is accompanied by phrases such as
"all," "entire," "whole," "only," "nothing but." If it refers
everything to itself, and has no opening beyond itself, there
is no breach through which there might be escape from it,
no breach through which something not within its terms
might enter the world, nothing outside it - you and me,
to begin with.
Interestingly, those who immediately see this vanishing,
this endpoint of radical ignorance, are mathematicians.
Within mathematics there is a school, again called
constructivists, who would absorb mathematical reality into
the cosmology summarized by Searle and Jacob and identify
mathematical objects with neurological states in the way
Darwin was on the brink of doing as "the horrid doubt" rose
within him. Mathematical "realists," who comprise I am
told the majority of mathematicians though mathematics is
not, of course, ruled by majority rule, reject this, at least for
mathematics, and testify to a sense of illumination and discovery of something not only outside themselves but beyond
the material world.
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n seeing this self-swallowing quality of total theory,
it may be thought that one is seeing no more than a
logical problem in an argument that it is "true" there
is no "truth," or in an argument that you should
"believe" there is no "belief" because, to spell it out, "belief"
is a property of a system that is a chance variation with no
larger claim to notice than that it was selected for the
moment.
But it is not a problem of logic that is seen. What is
being seen here is the way these urgings of total visions point
so nicely beyond themselves, to where, standing outside the
talk, are the persons talking. This beyond is what is seen.
To argue logic as logic is typically argued is actually to move
from life and persons talking to a particular form of thought
that for the moment ignores persons talking and might
make "b e1·1ef" or "truth" a "property" or "fieature, " surrounded by a fence, capturable. But a "belief" that there is
no belief is not the same thing as a belief. "Truth" that there
is no truth is not the same thing as a truth. Truth and belief
are not in boxes, separate from believing persons and the
truth of persons and all that persons who believe actually
believe and all they truly consider truth. It is not paradox
or circle that is seen when a system that is total is packaged,
presented, and urged. The response is seeing ever more
vividly what the paradox or circle points out to.
This is the significance of the phrases "in my opinion" or
"I think" or "I am persuaded" - statements familiar enough
to the lawyer - when they are spoken by the scientist. In
those phrases is the opening in any total cosmological vision
being urged, the limit of its reach. The scientist is always
there, the good scientist (for there can be good science and
bad science) showing good faith toward other scientists,

I
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toward experimental method, toward the profession, the
good scientist working toward and trying to express acts of
the creative imagination, drawn on by wonder and awe that
are truly wonder and awe.
The scientist's evident attachment to value belies Jacques
Monod's summation of science, well-known because of his
Nobel Prize for physiology and well-known because it is so
clear and sharp: "In an objective system ... any mingling of
knowledge with values is unlawful, forbidden." 18 System,
and objectivity, and the absence of the value of the person
and the person's values, linked together. But there is implicit
affirmation of value and the person constantly going on
within science and in the presentation of scientific
cosmologies to nonscientists. The scientist may say to the
nonscientist, on the matter of cosmology, "You're wrong."
But there are implicit affirmations in her bothering to say it.
There are implicit affirmations in her use of "wrong," in her
not just saying, but her saying to, and in her not just saying
to the wind and ocean, but her saying to you.
If the scientist then goes on to present a vision of what is
right, there are implicit affirmations of value and the person
in her bothering to assert it, in her attempt to persuade, in
her pointing, in her very act of presenting it. Even if she
were to say that you, or I, or we, are insignificant, meaningless, there is the question what that significance is for her in
her "insignificance," that to which the prefix "in" is attached,
what that meaning is for her to which "less" is attached in
her word "meaningless." She affirms things, she denies
things, whenever she opens her mouth. You affirm things,
you deny things whenever you look at me or I look at you,
whenever you appeal to me or I to you - whenever, indeed,
you dismiss what I say.
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Thus you, or anyone, could say with Searle that the
person just is, as water is, and go from there, with of course
the thought presented that the person is essentially the same
as water, the emergent property of a system of causes operating without purpose within rules without purpose. But in
fact, in actual fact, you must always begin with the person,
begin there rather than with the particles and systems the
person has predicted and seen and shown in the world.
There is the scientist in all of us. We all, scientists
included, depend on the testimony of others. Beginning
with the person, connecting scientific insight to the person
with all that such connection acknowledges and affirms,
does not dissolve scientific insight into historical process,
scatter it, make it vanish. Persons speak and persons listen.
And so for scientists in the "science wars," faced by total
theorists who call themselves historicists or social
constructivists and who urge that all that has been achieved
in science is nothing more than the beliefs of a passing sect,
epiphenomena! glitter, science itself indistinguishable from
fashion in clothes: Scientists might say in response that, read
as a whole, seriously and closely, we cannot think you really
mean what you seem to be saying. What can be said to the
scientist as total theorist can be said by the scientist to the
total theorist challenging science.
There is in this also what would seem to me the likely
response to the obvious question, why Christianity, or any
organized religion within which life is lived from birth to
death, is not a total system, as total as the total view of the
universe including living things as a system of systems. The
comparison leads back to the sense each of us may have of
what is representative to which I referred earlier, and the
difficulty of determining what is representative and the
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necessity of a mutual appeal to impressions and a feel for
things. Any comparison must also be somewhat specific, to
Christianity in its Orthodox form or Catholic or Protestant
strict or broad or Evangelical; or to Judaism ultra-Orthodox,
Orthodox, or non-Orthodox; or Islam Sunni, Shiite, or Sufi;
or Buddhism in its various forms, Hinduism in its various
forms.
But for Christianity in general, if there is such, the
response would be, I think, that Christianity is not a system
despite efforts to make it so, any more than human language
is a system independent of its utterers despite efforts to make
it so. And I would think also that insofar as Christianity is
objectified and held out for examination, there is limitation
within it - in the person at its center and the person always
in its particulars, the person or persons that limit tendencies
to occupy the mind with formulae or the equivalent of formulae under its aegis; there is limitation within it in the
doubt that is associated with faith just as certainty is set
against faith and offers to do without it; there is limitation
within it in openness to experience and the utterly new that
denies the dosedness of a total system. The fundamental
absence of total schema, it might be urged, becomes evident
each time its own bureaucracies and, yes, atrocities are
criticized most effectively within its own aspirational terms
pointing to the person in the large and in the particular.
n dosing I want to return to the comments I made
at the beginning about why, of all disciplines and all
people, law and the legally trained might be interested in these matters. Obviously, how lawyers
deal with situations in which respect for the humanity of a
human being has fundamentally disappeared, or suffering is
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caused by an individual without any trace of suffering in
himself, is not at all satisfactory. How lawyers deal with
such situations is no present model, neither lawyers' thought
nor their action - they can be charged with contributing to
such situations.
But lawyers cannot choose to put such situations out of
mind. Whatever their dilemmas, they must make a decision, move toward preventing the actions of others, scientists' included, or making others' actions possible, scientists'
included. This, the inescapability of involvement, is one
reason why there may be a contribution from law to the
increasingly heated discussion of cosmology that marks the
end of this century. Lawyers' thought and lawyers' action
are connected; cosmology is never far removed from law.
More important, though, than the connection between
thought and action in the lawyer's own work is the lawyer's
natural treatment of testimony and evidence, whether the
question at issue is large or small. The lawyer's, the judge's,
and the juror's experience is that there are many voices, each
asserting the truth about a matter, that may differ without
lying on the part of any, and that may be each attended to
with care while still supposing there is such a thing as the
truth. A reminder of this may usefully precede cosmological
argument, given that there is no place for many voices in
a theory once it has become a total theory, any more than
there is in totalitarian social and political thought.
Furthermore, with the testimony of any witness, with
any text, with the evidence in any case, the thrust of legal
thought is toward the whole that is presented, everything
said, the whole testimony, all parts of a document, opinion,
or statute, before any conclusion is drawn about the
meaning of any part of it - before, as I said, any judgment
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is made about the very meaning of the words being used by
someone to say what is believed, said, or proposed. The
whole includes, as I have emphasized here, gesture, action,
self-restraint; and as a matter of methodology and training,
the lawyer extends this interest in the whole to testimony
and statement and action spread over time, maintaining in
organized and even formal discourse the common observation we make in ordinary life, that what one believes is not
summed up in what one does or says one believes at any
particular point.
This is of course law's own form of totality, this interest
in all the evidence - whatever may be chosen to be left out,
for purposes of particular decisions, in the interest of justice ·
or autonomy or practicality. Science at its best comes dose
to this, values the empirical, celebrates it. But science in the
end must exclude in the dogmatic sense if it is to pursue its
method. The problem really arises at the cosmological level,
the theories of everything we have been considering, where
the exclusion of and designed indifference to human
evidence can become a credal matter rather than merely
methodological - merely methodological, but, as we
know, wonderfully enabling.
Then, too, the lawyer may be rather well situated to see
the tacit assumption in speakers' speaking about the nature
of things, that they, the speakers, can use and appeal to
human law. The assumption may be not just tacit but hidden from the speaker's own view, as may also be hidden the
implications of an appeal to human law, the entry of law's
presuppositions, transcendence of space and time in the
construction of an authoritative voice, internalization of
value, the connection between language and person, the
mutuality of good faith.
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Lawyers are attuned to the working of systems, looking
for them, anticipating them. But lawyers are also listening
to and for the person - they must: they can proceed really
only on authority. All else is mounting force, blood or feint,
disintegration. And working openly with and toward
authority, the lawyer may be in a special position to observe
the operation of authority in other disciplines even when the
practitioners of other disciplines explicitly deny its presence.
Again, lawyers may be in a position to indicate what the
presence of authority might mean for the reach of the
premises upon which the discipline proceeds.
Finally, the lawyer or the participant in law sees the
individual and can usefully remember the experience of
seeing the individual when considering total theories,
including those theories that make the individual merely a
construction constructed by a changing system. In highly
articulated, or systematic, or what is called "professional"
thinking and writing, there is something of an ascendancy of
interest in the statistical. In the strong light of that interest,
law protects the individual from fading. In all statistical
work and all probabilistic understanding there is a push
against the individual. Against this push stands the distinctively legal form of thought, not alone, of course, but there,
rescuing the individual, pulling out the individual from the
rush and flow, seeing the individual in all his or her strange
newness and special particulars, categorizing, of course;
generalizing and grouping, of course, because use of language and any general thought does so, but holding onto
and valuing the individual for his or her own sake. Law is
an extraordinary and largely unnoticed force in modern
thought - a counterforce.
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These professed visions of the nature of the world that
includes us, these pictures of everything where everything is
included, I think we know are inadequate, incoherent, and
wrong. We know that, that at the least, even if we could not
do better in presenting a picture that is adequate, coherent,
and right.
How do we know? Do we just know, like a stubborn
child, that these visions do not fit the truth?
Some of us know, and report in ways that compel
our attention, from art and through art, from music and
through music, from direct touch of expressed meaning.
Revelation some call it: a true epiphany, which candor with
ourselves and others allows through, as more than a wish or
a hope.
Less direct, more inferential, we know from a sense of
necessity as strong as the necessity we feel in gravity itself.
And we know from those who present these visions to
us, because they tell us so in so many ways.

[i]
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